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Abstract: 
The producer support estimate (the successor to the producer support equivalent) calculated 
by the OECD is widely used as an indicator of distortions created by agricultural policies. In 
this paper we demonstrate that changes in the relative (percentage) PSE are not an accurate 
indicator of the implications of policy reform for domestic welfare or for trade distortions. 
We demonstrate that it is important to consider the implications of changes in both the level 
and the form of support in evaluating the impact of policy reform. Using a model of 
Norwegian agriculture we show that reforms indicated towards the provision of public 
goods, while apparently leading to an increase in relative support, are actually superior to 
existing agricultural policies or to a policy aimed at eliminating subsidized exports both in 
terms of reducing trade distortions and increasing domestic economic welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
The producer subsidy estimate (PSE) is a measure of the monetary transfer to producers from 
consumers and taxpayers through existing agricultural policies. Its conceptual basis is as a 
summary of the incidence of government policies through an equivalent subsidy. Originally 
the acronym PSE stood for producer subsidy equivalent. The theoretical foundation for the 
PSE was established by Corden (1971); Josling (1973 and 1975) applied the concept to 
agricultural policies and coined the term producer subsidy equivalent. 
Since the mid 1980s the OECD has published data on the PSE for OECD members 
and for some non member countries.  OECD’s annual estimates provide the only readily 
available and consistent source of internationally comparable information on levels of 
support for agriculture. Cahill and Legg (1989-90) and Legg (2003) provide an overview of 
the definitions and use of the OECD’s support measurements. 
The publication of internationally comparable PSE figures has increased transparency 
on the nature and incidence of agricultural policies in OECD countries. The PSE concept has 
also contributed to establishing a base for internationally binding commitments on domestic 
support through the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) in the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO).1 
Given the prominence of the OECD, and the WTO connection, it is not surprising that 
PSE estimates have attracted much public attention and received wide media coverage. The 
summary measure, relative PSE or %PSE  (expressed as a percentage of the value of gross 
farm receipts) is frequently cited in the international debate on agricultural policies, and used 
as a yardstick of policy “misconduct”, i.e., unfair competition with farmers in unsubsidizing 
countries.  The higher a country’s relative PSE, the more likely that the country’s agricultural 
policy will be criticised by other countries (e.g., Oxfam, 2005).. 
Nevertheless, as indicated by Tangermann (2005), the relative PSE is merely a 
measure of monetary transfers from consumers and taxpayers, and thus an indicator of policy 
effort in favor of farmers.  It was never intended to be an indicator of protection or trade 
impact, and high relative PSEs do not necessarily indicate such effects. 
  Whether a high relative PSE is indicative of policy misconduct cannot be determined 
from the PSE figure alone, but hinges fundamentally on whether the welfare benefits of 
policies exceed their costs.  This is the thread that we follow in this paper.  We examine 
welfare theory and investigate how a switch in the direction of policies with a better 
                                                     
1 The principal difference between the AMS and an equivalent calculation in the PSE is that the former uses 
fixed international reference prices derived from a specific base period, while the latter uses current 
international reference prices.  
theoretical foundation will affect PSE figures. We also explore the relationship between the 
PSE and trade distortions.  
2. Agricultural support and trade distortions 
It is widely accepted that there are externalities and public goods related to agricultural 
activity. Examples cited are the amenity value of the landscape, food security, and 
preservation of rural communities and rural lifestyle (see Winters, 1989–1990 and OECD, 
2001).  The implications for agricultural policy are controversial, in particular, whether the 
provision of support can be justified to ensure the production of non-commodity outputs, and 
what policy instruments are efficient in achieving desired output levels.  In the current WTO 
negotiations, for example, some high-cost countries have used alleged non-commodity 
outputs (the so-called “multifunctionality” of agriculture) to argue for the maintenance of 
import protection. Low-cost exporting countries reject such arguments. Their view is 
supported by studies that demonstrate that efficient policies for multifunctional agriculture do 
not depend on import protection (e.g., Chang et al., 2005; Peterson et al., 2002). 
If we accept that the central role of agricultural policy is to correct for market failure, 
Pigouvian subsidies equal to marginal benefits should be used whenever agricultural 
activities, through production or input use, affect the supply of public goods and positive 
externalities (Blandford and Boisvert, 2002). However, such subsidies would clearly be 
counted in the PSE.   
Consider the case of no subsidies, no tariffs and no non-tariff trade restrictions, and 
consequently a PSE equal to zero.  With positive externalities this would clearly be 
suboptimal, as production and/or input use would fall short of optimal levels.  Correcting this 
through Pigouvian subsidies would result in a positive PSE, but that would not indicate 
policy misconduct. On the contrary, it would be the result of an optimal policy that 
internalizes externalities.  If support were initially provided by means other than Pigouvian 
subsidies, a switch to an optimal policy might well result in a reduction in the total PSE since 
prices and, most likely, production would decline.  However, the relative PSE might be 
unchanged or even increase.  To investigate this formally we use a simple partial model. 
We assume the following production function for agriculture: 
(1)   , 1                ,  ≤+= βαβα KLY
where Y is agricultural production,  L is land, and K is an aggregate of other factors of 
production, which for simplicity we refer to as capital.  The Cobb-Douglas function is chosen 
mainly for expositional clarity.  In the appendix we provide derivations for the more general 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) case.  
Producer surplus as defined by the profit function is: 
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(2)        ,rKwLpY −−=Π
where p is the price of the agricultural good and w and r are the prices of land and capital 
respectively.  Using the small country, small sector argument we assume that output and 
factor prices are given, and we further assume that there are no tariff or non-tariff trade 
barriers so that p is the world market price. 
Maximizing profit yields the following supply and factor demand functions under the 
assumption of perfect competition:  
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Now let us assume that agricultural land generates a domestic public good in the form 
of amenity benefits, for which society has a constant marginal willingness to pay.  The social 
optimum can be found by maximizing the following welfare function:  
(4)       , LCSW γ++Π=  
where γ  is the constant marginal willingness to pay for landscape amenity. CS is consumer 
surplus, which is constant since the agricultural good can be freely imported or exported at 
the world market price p.  
Assuming now that p = w = r = 1, we use the competitive, free trade, no subsidy case 
as a point of reference: 
(5)  
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The welfare optimum is characterized by:  
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Comparing (6) with (4) and (5), we see that the welfare optimum can be achieved in a 
competitive setting by using a Pigouvian subsidy, γ=Ls , per unit of land. We also see that 
the welfare optimum requires higher production of the agricultural good and greater land use, 
but lower production per unit of land than the no-subsidy case.  The welfare optimum also 
requires greater use of capital, but lower capital intensity than the competitive (no-subsidy) 
case.  
In this model the absolute and relative PSEs are:  
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We now define a measure of trade distortion as the relative difference between 
production of the agricultural good under no support and with the subsidy.   
(8)            0 1- 
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where TD* is the level of trade distortion with respect to the welfare optimum, increasing in 
γ. 2 
Now consider the case where agricultural support is proportional to production and 
the subsidy rate is .   This gives the following solution: Ys
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2 While theoretically sound, an exact measure of trade distortion may be difficult to calculate in practice given 
that both consumption and production may change and that there can be reversals in net trade. In the empirical 
example used in the paper we employ an index of changes in production as a proxy measure for trade distortion. 
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In order to compare this to the welfare optimum we set the subsidy rate such 
that *LL =) .  It then follows from (8) and (9) that: 
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As this difference is increasing in γ it must always be positive:  
(12) 
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From (12) we see that the size of the relative PSE in the product support case compared to the 
area support case is indeterminate. The sign depends on willingness to pay (γ ), the scale 
elasticity (α+β), the distribution parameter, that is the relative values of α and β,  and, in the 
more general CES case, on the elasticity of substitution. This is illustrated in Figure 1. For a 
distribution parameter equal to 0.1 and a scale elasticity of 0.99, that is α= 0.099 and 
β=0.891, we have computed:  
  
ESP
PSE
ˆ%
*%  
for various values of the willingness to pay (γ ) – given on the horizontal axis. For the Cobb-
Douglas case we see that for low γ  the ratio of the %PSE (on the vertical axis) is lower for 
area support. For γ  in excess of 0.2 the opposite is the case. In addition we graph the results 
for a low elasticity of substitution of 0.5, and a high elasticity of substitution of 2. The two 
curves are based on the CES derivations in the appendix. Again we see that the ratio of the 
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%PSE is lower for area support when γ  is low. The critical value of γ  increases with the 
substitution elasticity. 
Figure 1: Relative %PSE for area support compared to product support 
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For the trade distortion we have that: 
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since   0>+ βα .  
It follows that it is possible that a switch from a suboptimal (production subsidy) to an 
optimal (input subsidy) policy may well lead to an increase in the relative PSE rather than a 
decrease.  This is more likely the more closely external effects from agriculture are tied to 
some, but not all, inputs rather than to production and the lower the elasticity of substitution 
among inputs.  Simulations of such policy changes using a model for the Norwegian 
agricultural sector, discussed below, seem to indicate that this is a realistic possibility. 
Tangermann (2005) argues that even if the overall PSE figures cannot be interpreted 
as an indicator of policy misconduct, the OECD breakdown of the PSE into various 
categories provides additional information for assessing existing policies and the impact of 
reform.  Of the total PSE for the OECD area in 2005 more than three quarters was in the form 
of market price support (that is associated with border protection), payments based on 
production, and payments based on input use (Figure 2).  Another fifth was based on area 
planted, animal numbers, or historical entitlements.  Based on such data Tangermann 
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concludes: “for the OECD area overall, less than 5% of the PSE is currently in a form that 
may potentially be targeted to specific public goods.” (Tangermann 2005, p. 11).   
While we agree that a breakdown of the PSE figures into sub categories can help in 
assessing policy reforms, we have problems with the sweeping conclusion above.  The sub 
categories of support seem naturally to fall in three groups:  that varying directly with 
production, like market price support and payments based on output, that indirectly related to 
production, like support based on area planted, animal numbers and input use, and that 
completely decoupled from production.  Tangermann seems to assert that Pigouvian 
subsidies may only be included in the third group. 
Figure 2. Composition of Producer Support Estimate for 
the OECD (% share)
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Source: OECD PSE/CSE database (2005). 
In the final part of the paper we use Norway to provide empirical examples of the 
impact of changes in policy on the PSE as well as a range of domestic indicators, such as 
production, land use, employment, and domestic welfare (economic surplus).  Norway is 
particularly well suited to serve as an example in this respect. In 2005 its relative PSE was 
64%, a figure exceeded only by Switzerland (68%) and Iceland (67%). Norway’s agricultural 
policies are often criticised as being trade distorting and far from optimal (e.g., Lamy, 2007). 
We use a numerical model of the Norwegian agricultural sector to simulate the effects of two 
 8 
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policy alternatives - reorientation to the production of public goods and to the elimination of 
subsidized exports. 
3. Model simulations 
Our analysis is based on a price-endogenous model of the Norwegian agriculture described in 
appendix 2. The model covers the most important commodities produced by the Norwegian 
agricultural sector, in all 13 final and 8 intermediate product aggregates. The model is based 
on the maximization of economic surplus. 
In what follows we use the model to show how production and trade vary with the 
agricultural policy pursued. The first example examines a policy exclusively targeted to the 
provision of agricultural public goods through the payment of input-based subsidies 
(primarily on land). The second example focuses on the elimination of production surpluses 
and subsidized exports. In this case, structural change is permitted and production is achieved 
at the lowest domestic cost through a move to larger farms and the relocation to the most 
productive agricultural land.   
 As a basis for comparison, column 1 in Table 1 presents the model’s representation of 
the existing policy in 1998. In spite of climatic disadvantages3, production was high and 
imports were low. Norway is self-sufficient in most of the products listed. For dairy products 
there is a surplus and the equivalent of roughly 12% of domestic milk production is disposed 
of through subsidized exports of cheese. The Arctic climate does not permit sufficient 
production of high-quality grain for bread-making, so roughly half of the wheat used 
domestically is imported. Agricultural production is generally intensive (with high use of 
purchased inputs) but takes place on relatively small farms in most parts of Norway. 
 As may be seen, the present policy is costly. The total PSE for Norway is NOK 20 
billions (roughly US$ 3.7 billlion at current exchange rates) and equals 71 % of the value of 
production at the farm level. Divided by employment and land area support is NOK 250,000 
($46,000) per full-time equivalent worker (FTE)and NOK 20,000 ($3,700) per hectare. A 
break-down of the PSE into various categories, shows that about 50% of the support is in the 
form of market price support, generated by import tariffs that range from 300 – 500 % and 
export subsidies. The rest of the support is through payments based on output (15%), area 
planted or animal numbers (12%) and input use (25%).  
 The final row in Table 1 contains an index of distortion associated with current 
policy. This index is defined as the ratio of the current value of agricultural production valued 
at world market prices to the value of production under free trade. This indicates that 
                                                     
3For example, on average, wheat and potato yields are about 60% of the levels achieved in central Europe. 
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production is roughly three times larger under the current support policy in Norway than 
would be the case under free trade.4 
Most of the support under the current policy is currently attached to the production of 
private goods. Even the support that is linked to land, animals or other inputs is only targeted 
to the provision of public goods to a minor degree, e.g., through requirements for landscape 
preservation or restrictions on agricultural production practices. Therefore, the present policy 
is weakly targeted to sources of market failure.    
 The implications of a policy exclusively aimed at the provision of public goods are 
illustrated in Column 2 of Table 1, following an approach by Brunstad et al. (1999, 2005). In 
this case, the amenity value of the agricultural landscape is taken into account by 
incorporating information on willingness to pay, as inferred from contingent valuation 
studies, in the objective function of the model. On the basis of these studies, the amenity 
value is higher for grazing and pasture than for tilled land, and the marginal willingness to 
pay diminishes with increased agricultural activity.   
 As the results show, when public good provision is the policy aim, agricultural 
production and employment fall substantially, but a large proportion of land remains in 
production (64% of the base level solution). A switch towards land-intensive production 
techniques takes place, represented by extensive sheep meat production. The total PSE falls 
to roughly 40% of the current level, but as a percentage of the production value support 
increases from 60% to 67%. This shows that the percentage PSE is not a good indicator of 
how welfare or trade is affected by the change in policy. In this scenario support is 
exclusively tied to factors related to the public goods (land, labor and livestock). No market 
price support or deficiency payments are used. Because of technological interlinkages, 
production and trade are affected, but to a far lesser extent than under current policies. As a 
result the index of distortion shows some positive effect of the policy since production is 8% 
higher than under free trade in the absence of support. 
Column 3 of Table 1 shows the results of eliminating subsidized dairy exports 
(cheese), i.e., a policy oriented to the elimination of the most visible trade distortion. Under 
this scenario, which relies heavily on the use of direct output subsidies, structural change 
increases efficiency. The results indicate that current production for the domestic market (the 
elimination of export surpluses) can be sustained with only 40% of the present employment 
and 90% of the land. Production takes place on substantially larger farms, and relatively more 
of the production is concentrated in areas where the best land is located. Economic welfare is 
                                                     
4 Norwegian agricultural policies distort both production and consumption, as indicated by the market price 
support component of the PSE in the table. This index does not capture the additional distortion created through 
reduced consumption. 
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therefore considerably higher than in the base solution. Total support is about 40% lower, and 
the percentage PSE has been reduced from 60% to 50%. 
 However, because of the need to maintain production in this scenario support is 
completely tied to production (85% through deficiency payments and 15% through market 
price support), which means that only minor advances are made in reducing trade distortions. 
The index of distortion falls, but only from roughly 3.9 to 3.2 and is much higher than the 
public goods case.  Compared to the public goods option, economic welfare is also lower. 
Although land use is higher, support is not targeted to the provision of public goods leading 
to more capital intensive and specialised production patterns. Consequently, in spite of a 
substantially lower percentage PSE, this policy is inferior to the public goods alternative, 
both with respect to welfare and to the reduction of trade distortions.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have demonstrated that changes in the relative (percentage) PSE are not an 
accurate indicator of the implications of policy reform for domestic welfare or for trade 
distortions. It is important to consider the implications of changes in both the level and the 
form of subsidies in evaluating the impact of policy reform. The example of Norway shows 
that reforms oriented towards the provision of agricultural public goods, while apparently 
leading to an increase in relative support, are actually superior in terms of reducing trade 
distortions and increasing domestic economic welfare. 
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Table 1: Model results  
 Base 
(current 
policies) 
 
Public  
goods 
Elimination 
of subsidized 
exports 
Production (mill. kg.)    
    Milk 1,672 710 1,400 
    Beef and veal 82   29 82 
    Pig meat 100   0 125 
    Sheep meat 23   30 23 
    Poultry meat  28   0 28 
    Eggs 44 10 44 
    Wheat 211   150 211 
    Coarse grains   1,021 339 1,021 
    Potatoes  298 312 298 
Land use (mill. hectares)  0.9 0.5 0.7 
Employment (1000 person-years) 60 18 25 
Economic surplus (billion NOK) 14 24 12 
PSE (percentage) 60% 67% 50% 
PSE (billion NOK) 15 6 9 
    Market price support 7 0 1 
    Output support 2 0 8 
    Input support  6 6 0 
Index of distortion 388% 108% 324% 
 
Note: the index of distortion is actual production valued at world market prices relative to 
estimated production under free trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1: 
The following equations are numbered as in the main text. The CES production function is: 
(1’)  ( ) ρ/λρρ )Kα1(LαY −+=            1ρ,1λ ≤<   , 
λ is the scale parameter assumed to be less than one, i.e. decreasing returns to scale and ρ is connected 
to the elasticity of substitution, , through: σ
ρσ −= 1
1
. 
It is useful to consider the following special cases: 
(i) ρ = 1: linear production function 
(ii) ρ = 0:  Cobb Douglas, i. e., as in the main text 
(iii) ρ = -∞: Leontief production function. 
The profit function is: 
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We refer to (5’) as the perfectly competitive solution. 
 
With a constant willingness to pay for landscape amenities, define as γ per unit of land, L, the welfare 
optimum yields: 
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By comparing (6’) and (5’) we see that welfare optimum requires greater production of the 
agricultural good, greater land use, but lower production per land unit than the perfectly competitive 
case.  If ρλ > , the welfare optimum requires greater use of capital. but capital intensity is always 
lower than the perfectly competitive case.   
The producer subsidy equivalent is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) )λ1(ρ
)ρλ(
ρ1
1
1ρ
ρρ1
1ρ1
1
λ1
1
α1γ1α
γ1
α
λγ*Lγ*PSE
−−
−−−
−
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−==  
(7’) 
 ( ) ( ) 1ρ111ρρρ11ρ1
1
α1γ1α
γ1
α
γλ
*Y
*Lγ*PSE%
−
−−−
−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−== . 
Since we have an increasing γ , this implies an increasing %PSE. 
Our measure of trade distortion is:  
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Hence, an increasing γ  implies an increasing TD*. 
Subsidizing output instead of land yields: 
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where sY is the rate of output subsidy. In this case the PSE is: 
 ( ) ( )    ρ)λ1(
λ)ρ1(
ρ1
1ρ1
1
λ1
λ
YYY α1αλ)s1(sYˆsESˆP
−−
−−− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++==  
and 
 
Y
Y
Y
Y
s1
s
Yˆ)s1(
YˆsESˆP% +=+= . 
We see that  is increasing in sY. The trade distortion is:  ESP ˆ%
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and DT ˆ  is also increasing in sY. 
A comparison between the two cases, assuming   
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It now follows that sY must be set such that: 
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where  is given by (10’).  Ys
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Appendix 2 
The model is a partial equilibrium model of the Norwegian agricultural sector. For given input 
costs and demand functions, market clearing prices and quantities are computed.  Prices of goods 
produced outside the agricultural sector or abroad are taken as given. As the model assumes full 
mobility of labor and capital, it must be interpreted as a long run model. 
 The model covers the most important products produced by the Norwegian agricultural 
sector, in all 14 final and 9 intermediate products.  Most products in the model are aggregates.  
Primary inputs are: land (four different grades), labor (family members and hired), capital 
(machinery, buildings, and livestock) and other inputs (fertilizers, fuel, seeds, etc.).  The prices of 
inputs are determined outside the model and treated as given. 
 Supply in the model is domestic production and imports.  Domestic production takes 
place on approximately 400 different “model farms”. The farms are modeled with fixed input 
and output coefficients, based on data from extensive farm surveys carried out by the Norwegian 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute, a research body connected to the Norwegian 
Ministry of Agriculture. Imports take place at given world market prices inclusive of tariffs and 
transport costs. Domestic and foreign products are assumed to be perfect substitutes.  The 
country is divided into nine production regions, each with limited supply of the different grades 
of land. This regional division allows for variation in climatic and topographic conditions and 
makes it possible to specify regional goals and policy instruments. The products from the model 
farms go through processing plants before they are offered on the market. The processing plants 
are partly modeled as pure cost mark-ups (meat, eggs and fruit), and partly as production 
processes of the same type as the model farms (milk and grains). 
 The domestic demand for final products is represented by linear demand functions.  
These demand functions are based on existing studies of demand elasticities, and are linearized 
to pass through the observed price and quantity combination in the base year (1998).  Between 
the meat products there are cross price effects, but only own price effects are assumed for other 
products. The demand for intermediate products is derived from the demand for the final 
products for which they are inputs. Exports take place at given world market prices.  
 Domestic demand for final products is divided among 5 separate demand regions, which 
have their own demand functions. Each demand region consists of one or several production 
regions.  If products are transported from one region to another, transport costs are incurred.  For 
imports and exports transport costs are incurred from the port of entry and to the port of 
shipment, respectively. In principle restrictions can be placed on all variables in the model. The 
restrictions that we include can be divided into two groups: 
(1)  Scarcity restrictions: upper limits for the endowment of land, for each grade of land in 
each region.   
 17 
(2)  Political restrictions: lower limits for land use and employment in each region, for groups 
of regions (central regions and remote areas), or for the country as a whole; maximum or 
minimum quantities for domestic production, imports or exports; maximum prices. 
In the model, economic surplus (consumers’ plus producers’ surplus) of the agricultural sector is 
maximized. This maximization is performed subject to demand and supply relationships and the 
imposed restrictions. Which restrictions are included depends upon what kind of simulation that 
is attempted. The solution to the model is found as the prices and quantities that give equilibrium 
in each market. No restrictions can be violated, and no model farm or processing plant that is 
active, runs at a loss. 
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